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Abstract— Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a 
new transport layer protocol that is due to replace TCP 
(Transmission Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram 
Protocol) protocols in future IP networks. Currently, it is 
implemented in such operating systems like BSD, Linux, HP-
UX or Sun Solaris.  It is also supported in Cisco network 
devices operating system (Cisco IOS) and may be used in 
Windows. This paper describes potential steganographic 
methods that may be applied to SCTP and may pose a threat 
to network security. Proposed methods utilize new, 
characteristic SCTP features like multi-homing and multi-
streaming. Identified new threats and suggested 
countermeasures may be used as a supplement to RFC 5062, 
which describes security attacks in SCTP protocol and can 
induce further standard modifications. 
Keywords: steganography, SCTP 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Steganographic techniques have been used for ages and 
dates back to the ancient Greece [4]. The aim of the 
steganographic communication back then and now, in 
modern applications, is the same: hide secret data 
(steganogram) in innocent looking cover and send it to the 
proper recipient which is aware of the information hiding 
procedure. In ideal situation the existence of hidden 
communication cannot be detected by third parties. What 
distinguishes historical steganographic methods from 
modern ones is, in fact, only the form of the cover (carrier) 
for secret data. Historical methods used human skin, wax 
tables or letters etc., nowadays rather digital media like 
pictures, audio, video which are transmitted using 
telecommunication networks were often used. Recent trend 
in steganography is utilization of the network protocols as a 
steganogram carrier by modifying content of the packets 
they use, time relations between these packets or hybrid 
solutions. All of the information hiding methods that may be 
used to exchange steganograms in telecommunication 
networks is described by the term network steganography 
which was originally introduced by Szczypiorski in 2003 [8]. 
Many steganographic methods have been proposed and 
analyzed, e.g. [1]-[4]. They should be treated as a threat to 
network security, because they may cause e.g. confidential 
information leakage. Steganography as a network threat was 
marginalized for few years but now not only security staff 
but even business and consulting firms are becoming 
continuously aware of the potential danger and possibilities it 
creates [10]. 
Knowledge of the information hiding procedure is 
helpful to develop countermeasures therefore, it is important 
to identify potential, previously unknown possibilities for 
covert communication. It is especially important when it 
comes to new network protocols that are forecasted to be 
widely deployed in future networks. For example, the 
detailed analysis of information hiding methods in IPv6 
protocol header was presented by Lucena et al. [9]. The same 
case is with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 
[5] which is a transport layer protocol and its main role is 
similar to both popular protocols Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). It 
provides some of the same service features of both, ensuring 
reliable, in-sequence transport of messages with congestion 
control. Nevertheless, there are certain advantages which 
make SCTP a candidate for a transport protocol in future IP 
networks – the main are that it is multi-streaming and multi-
homing.  
To authors’ best knowledge, there are no steganographic 
methods proposed for SCTP protocol. However, information 
hiding methods that have been proposed for TCP and UDP 
protocols (e.g. utilizing free/unused or not strictly standard-
defined fields) may be utilized as well due to several 
similarities between these transport layer protocols and 
SCTP. Steganographic methods for TCP and UDP protocols 
were described by Rowland [1] and Murdoch and Lewis [2] 
and very good surveys on hidden communication can be 
found in Zander et al. [3] and Petitcolas et al. [4]. 
The popularity of the SCTP is still growing as it has been 
already deployed in many important operating systems like 
BSD, Linux (the most popular is lksctp [13]), HP-UX or Sun 
Solaris and is supported Cisco network devices operating 
system (Cisco IOS) and even in Windows if the proper 
library is installed [11]. 
This paper can be treated as a supplement to RFC 5062 
[12], which describes security attacks in SCTP protocol and 
current countermeasures. However, it does not include any 
information about steganography-based attacks and ways to 
prevent them. That is why, in this paper we identify new 
attack opportunities to network security for SCTP and 
propose detection and/or elimination techniques. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
gives brief overview of SCTP protocol. In Section 3 network 
steganography methods that are characteristic for SCTP 
protocol are presented. Section 4 provides possible detection 
and elimination solutions for proposed methods. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes our work. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SCTP PROTOCOL 
SCTP [5] was defined by the IETF Signaling Transport 
(SIGTRAN) working group in 2000, and is maintained by 
the IETF Transport Area (TSVWG) working group. It was 
being developed for one specific reason - transportation of 
telephony signaling over IP-based networks. However, its 
features make it capable of being general purpose transport 
layer protocol ([5], [6]). 
SCTP, like TCP, provides reliable, in-sequence data 
transport with congestion control, but it also eliminate 
limitations of TCP, which are more and more onerous in 
many applications. SCTP allows also to set order-of-arrival 
delivery of the data, which means that the data is delivered 
to the upper layer as soon as it is received (a sequence 
number is of no significance). Unordered transmission can 
be set for all messages or only for part of the messages 
depending on application need.  
The SCTP Partial Reliability Extension, defined in [7], is 
a mechanism which allows to send not all data if it is not 
necessary, i.e. data, which were not correctly received but 
got out-of-date. Decision not to transmit some data is made 
by sender. He/she has to inform a receiver that some data 
will not be sent and receiver should treat this data like 
correctly received and acknowledged. Partial Reliability 
Extension and order-of-arrival delivery enable to use SCTP 
in many applications which are using UDP now. 
In TCP all data is sent as a stream of bits with no 
boundaries between messages. This behavior requires that 
TCP-based applications have to do message framing and 
provide a buffer for incomplete messages from TCP agent. 
In SCTP, data is sent as separate messages passed by the 
upper layer. This feature makes SCTP-based applications 
easier to develop than TCP-based ones. 
Each SCTP connection (which is called association in 
SCTP) can use one or more streams, which are 
unidirectional logical channels between SCTP endpoints. 
Order-of-transmission or order-of-arrival delivery of data is 
performed within each stream separately, not globally. If 
one of the streams is blocked (i.e. a packet is lost and 
receiver is waiting for it), it does not affect other streams. 
Benefit of using multiple streams is illustrated in Fig. 1.  
 User X sends four messages (A, B, C, D) to user Y. 
There are two requirements concerning delivery order of 
these messages. Message A must be delivered before 
message B, and message C must be delivered before 
message D. In TCP messages are sent in following order: A, 
B, C, D (1). If message A is lost (2), other messages, in spite 
of the correct reception, cannot be dispatched to the upper 
layer until message A is retransmitted and successfully 
received by user Y (3). In SCTP, using multi-streaming, 
messages can be divided into two streams. Messages A and 
B can be sent within stream 1, and messages C and D can be 
sent within stream 2 (4). If message A is lost (5), only 
message B cannot be passed to the upper layer until 
message A is received. Messages C and D can be delivered 
to the upper layer, since they are sent within different stream 
than messages A and B (6).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of TCP and SCTP data transport using 
multiple streams 
 
Another SCTP feature is provision for protocol 
extensibility. Each SCTP packet consists of main header and 
one or more chunks (Fig. 2). There are two types of chunks: 
data chunks, which contain user data and control chunks, 
which are used to control data transfer. Each chunk consists 
of fields and parameters specific to chunk type (Fig. 3). 
Fields are mandatory, and parameters can be either 
mandatory or optional. SCTP packet structure allows 
defining not only new chunk types but also broadening 
functionality of the existing chunk types through defining 
new parameters. 
Common header
Chunk #1
Chunk #2
...
Chunk #n
 
Figure 2. SCTP packet format 
 
Parameter type Parameter length
Parameter value
Chunk type Chunk flags Chunk length
Chunk value
 
Figure 3. SCTP chunks and parameters format 
 
SCTP supports multi-homing i.e. host ability to be visible 
in the network through more than one IP address, for 
instance if host is equipped with a few NICs (Network 
Interface Cards). Multi-homing in SCTP is used to provide 
more reliable data transfer. If there are no packets losses, all 
messages are transmitted using one source address and one 
destination address (primary path). If chunk is retransmitted, 
it should be sent using different path (different source and 
destination addresses) than primary path. Another advantage 
of SCTP multi-homing in SCTP is ability to failover data 
transfer if primary path is down. 
SCTP uses a four-way handshake with cookie (Fig. 4), 
which provides protection against synchronization attack 
(type of Denial of Service attack) known from TCP. In 
SCTP, user initiates an association with INIT chunk. In 
response he/she receives INIT ACK chunk with cookie 
(containing information that identifies proposed 
connection). Then he/she replies with a COOKIE ECHO 
with copy of received cookie. Reception of this chunk is 
acknowledged with COOKIE ACK chunk. After successful 
reception of COOKIE ACK association is established. 
Afterwards connected users can send data using DATA 
chunks and acknowledge reception of them with SACK 
chunks. 
 
 
Figure 4. SCTP association establishment 
 
Aside from described features, SCTP provide also built-
in path MTU discovery, data fragmentation mechanism and, 
in general, it is considered more secure than TCP. 
III. SCTP-SPECIFIC STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS AND 
DETECTION POSSIBILITIES 
SCTP-specific steganographic methods can be divided in 
three groups: 
• Methods that modify content of SCTP packets. 
• Methods that modify how SCTP packets are 
exchanged. 
• Methods that modify both content of SCTP and the 
way they are exchanged – hybrid methods. 
A. Methods that modify content of SCTP packets 
As mentioned before, each SCTP packet consists of 
chunks and each chunk can contain variable parameters. We 
propose 13 new steganographic methods which modify 
content of SCTP packets in the following chunks and 
parameters: 
• INIT and INIT ACK chunks – used during 
initialization of SCTP association (methods I1, I2), 
• DATA chunks – which contain user data (methods 
D1, D2), 
• SACK chunks – used to acknowledge received 
DATA chunks (methods S1, S2), 
• AUTH chunk – used to authenticate chunks (method 
A1), 
• PAD chunk – used to pad packets (method P1), 
• Variable parameters – used in specific chunks. 
(methods VP1-5). 
 
Steganographic methods listed above are explained 
below. 
 
INIT and INIT ACK chunks 
(I1) Initiate Tag is a 32 bits value of Verification Tag 
field. It must be inserted into each SCTP packet, which is 
sent to the originator of INIT or INIT ACK chunks within 
this association. The Initiate Tag can be any value except 0, 
thus it may be used for steganographic purposes. Maximum 
bandwidth of this channel is 32 bits/chunk (fewer bits of this 
field should be used in order to limit chance of detection). 
(I2) Number of Inbound Streams is a 16 bits field which 
define the maximum number of inbound streams that sender 
of the INIT or INIT ACK can handle within this association. 
In most cases, using more than one hundred streams is 
unlikely, thus at least a few the most significant bits can be 
used to insert hidden data. To limit the risk of detection not 
only the most significant bits may be used. Potential 
bandwidth of this method is 8 bits/chunk. 
DATA chunks 
(D1) Stream Sequence Number (SSN) is a 16 bits 
sequence number within each stream. If order-of-arrival 
delivery of data is set, there are no requirements concerning 
SSN. This feature makes it possible to use SSN to send 
steganograms. Maximum bandwidth of this channel is 16 
bits/chunk. Presented method can be utilized only if 
unordered transmission is set for all data within a stream.  
(D2) Payload Protocol Identifier is a 32 bits field which 
represents an upper layer protocol identifier. This field is not 
used by SCTP agent, it is for purposes of upper layer 
protocols. Value 0 indicates no identifier, other values should 
be standardized with IANA. SCTP does not verify this value, 
so it can be used to send secret data. Maximum bandwidth of 
this channel is 32 bits/chunk. 
 
SACK chunks 
(S1) Advertised Receiver Window Credit is a 32 bits field 
which indicates current size of the SACK sender’s receiver 
buffer. A few least significant bits of this field can be utilized 
for steganographic purposes. Potential bandwidth of this 
method is 3-4 bits/chunk. It cannot be higher since it may 
affect flow control. 
(S2) Duplicate TSNs, which are part of the SACK chunk, 
are sequence numbers of the duplicate chunks which has 
been received. This mechanism may enable hidden 
communication through adding not duplicating chunks TSNs 
to the list of duplicate TSNs. In spite of 32 bits length of 
TSN, potential steganographic bandwidth is few bits per 
chunk. This is because adding very different TSNs from 
recently sent is easy to detect. Presented method is harder to 
detect if it is used by multi-homed hosts since it should be 
considered to send SACK chunks with duplicates to other 
address than source address of DATA chunks. 
AUTH chunks 
(A1) Shared Key Identifier is a 16 bits field that indicates 
which pair of shared keys is used in this chunk. This field 
can be used for covert communication because receiver of 
the packet can authenticate sender through checking all 
previously exchanged shared keys. Potential steganographic 
bandwidth of this channel is 1-4 bits/chunk since, in most 
cases, there will be not many shared keys available. 
Detection of this method is quite hard because shared keys 
are established outside SCTP protocol. 
PAD chunks 
(P1) Padding Data is a field which length depends on 
padding needs. There are no requirements concerning value 
of this field, so it can be used for covert communication. 
Thus, steganographic bandwidth of this channel depends on 
size of padding data. 
 
Variable Parameters 
(VP1) IPv4 Address in IPv4 Address Parameter and IPv6 
Address in IPv6 Address Parameter contain addresses of the 
sending endpoints. These parameters are used for multi-
homed hosts and can be attached to INIT, INIT ACK and 
ASCONF (used to dynamic address reconfiguration) chunks. 
Each address in these parameters is considered as 
unconfirmed until its reachability is not checked. This 
behavior allows using these parameters for steganographic 
purposes by sending secret data instead of IP address. 
Maximum bandwidth is 32 bits/parameter for IPv4 address 
and 128 bits/parameter for IPv6 address. 
(VP2) Heartbeat Info Parameter is used in 
HEARTBEAT chunk, which is exploited to verify 
reachability of the destination addresses. Heartbeat Info 
Parameter contains Sender-Specific Heartbeat Info field, 
which content is not defined, so it can be used a steganogram 
carrier. In Linux Kernel Stream Control Transmission 
Protocol (lksctp-2.6.28-1.0.10) implementation of SCTP, 
Sender-Specific Heartbeat Info field has 40 bytes, thus 
steganographic bandwidth for this methods is about 320 
bits/chunk. 
TABLE I.  SUMMARY OF METHODS’ POTENTIAL STEGANOGRAPHIC 
BANDWIDTH  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(VP3) Random Number in Random Parameter also can 
be used for covert communication. Steganographic 
bandwidth of this method depends on purpose of the number. 
If it is used in authentication process, random number has 32 
bits and it is sent in INIT or INIT ACK chunks. That is why 
the maximum steganographic bandwidth is 32 bits/chunk. 
(VP4) ASCONF-Request Correlation ID in Add IP 
Address Parameter, Delete IP Address Parameter and Set 
Primary Address Parameter is 32 bits field which identifies 
each request. The only requirement concerning its value is to 
be unique for each request, thus it may be used to transfer 
steganograms. The maximum steganographic bandwidth of 
this method is 32 bits/parameter.  
(VP5) Padding Data in Padding Parameter can be 
exploited for covert communication in the same way as 
Padding Data in Padding chunk (see method P1). Padding 
Parameter can be used only in the INIT chunk. 
 
B. Methods that modify how SCTP packets are exchanged 
 
MULTI-HOMING 
SCTP multi-homing feature can be utilized to perform 
hidden communication. The main idea of the proposed 
steganographic method is presented in Fig. 4. Two users 
establish SCTP association (User 1 and User 2), each of 
them is equipped with more than one NIC. The primary path 
for the users’ communication is through interfaces A and X 
(1). If n1 denotes the number of the alternative sender NIC 
addresses (in Fig. 4 they are 2), and n2 represents the number 
of alternative receiver NIC addresses (in Fig. 4 also 2) then 
each address can be used to represent one steganogram bit 
(or a sequence of bits). Possible alternative paths for 
communication between these users are: BY, BZ, CY and 
CZ. User 1’s B interface IP address represents binary ‘0’, C 
interface IP address binary ‘1’ (similar situation is for User 
2). Assigning the bits or sequence of bits to the users' NICs 
may depend on the IP addresses value i.e. available NICs 
addresses can be sorted from lowest to highest and then 
consecutive values (bit sequences) can be assigned to them.  
If User 1 wants to send steganogram, he/she waits for the 
transmission error on primary path to occur and then 
retransmits chunk through appropriate path. For example, in 
Fig. 4, if User 1 wants to send steganogram which consists of 
the sequence ‘01’, he/she waits for the transmission error on 
primary path to occur (1) and sends retransmitted packets 
through path BZ (2). Before sending steganogram it should 
be established which retransmitted chunks carry hidden data. 
Users can assume that all retransmissions carry bits of 
steganogram or should mark beginning of hidden 
communication, for example, with an initiation sequence (a 
sequence of retransmitted chunks through previously agreed 
paths). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Multi-homing based steganographic method 
 
Steganographic bandwidth SB-MH for this method can be 
expressed as 
 (3-1) 
Steganographic 
method 
Steganographic 
bandwidth Units 
I1 32 bits/chunk 
I2 8 bits/chunk 
D1 16 bits/chunk 
D2 32 bits/chunk 
S1 3-4 bits/chunk 
S2 3-4 bits/chunk 
A1 1-4 bits/chunk 
P1 varies n/a 
VP1 32 bits/par. 
VP2 320 bits/chunk 
VP3 32 bits/chunk 
VP4 32 bits/par. 
VP5 varies n/a 
]/[)(log)(log 2212 chunkbitsnnS MHB +=−
(1) 
(2) 
For example in Fig. 4, if SCTP packets rate is 250 
packets/s, assuming that each packet contains only single 
data chunk and the retransmission rate is 2% (retransmission 
rate in Internet is up to 5%), then achieved steganographic 
bandwidth is 10 bits/s. 
 
MULTI-STREAMING 
In SCTP, multi-streaming (for ordered delivery) is 
realized by utilizing two identifiers: Stream Identifier (SI), to 
uniquely mark stream and Stream Sequence Number (SSN) 
to ensure correct order of packets at the receiver. Despite 
these two identifiers each DATA chunk contains also 
Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) that is assigned 
independently to each chunk. 
Steganographic method that adopts multi-streaming is 
based on determined assignment of TSNs for every chunk 
distributed along different streams. SIs in subsequent DATA 
chunks will represent hidden data bits. The example for this 
method is presented in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Multi-streaming based steganographic method 
 
At initialization phase of the SCTP association users 
negotiate a number of utilized streams (in the example there 
are 4 streams).  Each stream is assigned with binary 
sequences (1) – from ‘00’ to ‘11’. Sending the data through 
certain stream depends on the steganogram bits. Therefore, if 
User X wants to secretly transfer ‘1011’ bits sequence he/she 
first sends data through stream 3, then through stream 4 (2). 
If s denotes the number of available streams, then maximum 
steganographic bandwidth SB-MS for this method may be 
expressed as 
   (3-2) 
For example, if we assume that the overt communication 
rate is 250 packets/s, each packet has only one chunk with 
data and 4 streams are used then the steganographic 
bandwidth is 500 bits/s. 
C. Hybrid method 
For SCTP partial reliability extension was also proposed 
by Stewart et al. [7]. It allows not retransmitting certain data 
despite the fact it was not successfully received. It is possible 
through the FORWARD TSN (FT) chunk, where new 
acknowledge TSN is inserted. After receiving such message 
receiving side treats missing chunks with equal or lower 
TSNs as they were properly delivered. This functionality 
may be adopted for steganographic purposes. The idea of the 
proposed method is similar in concept to LACK which was 
developed for real-time multimedia services by Mazurczyk 
and Szczypiorski [14].  
The main idea of the proposed method is presented in 
Fig. 6. 
User X User Y
User YUser X
User YUser X
48 7 5
FT: 8
ACK: 8
User X User Y
6Steganogram
6
 
Figure 6. Multi-streaming based steganographic method 
 
From the User X data sent chunk with TSN 6 is skipped 
and to this chunk steganogram is inserted (1). Next, User X 
sends FT chunk to signal new acknowledged TSN (2). After 
successful reception of FT chunk, User Y issues SACK 
chunk with new acknowledged TSN (3). When User X 
receives SACK chunk, he/she can send omitted DATA 
chunk with steganogram (4). 
If we assume that the overt communication rate is 250 
packets/s, each packet has only one chunk with payload size 
being 1000 bytes and we use 0.01% of packets to insert 
steganogram then the potential steganographic bandwidth is 
200 bits/s. 
IV. DETECTION POSSIBILITIES 
For each of the groups of steganographic methods 
proposed in Section 3 detection or elimination solutions are 
sketched. The main aim of this Section is to point out 
potential enhancements that may be applied to SCTP 
standard to alleviate steganography utilization, ideally, at the 
standard development stage. Therefore, proposed 
countermeasures should be treated as guidelines for standard 
improvements. 
A. Methods that modify content of SCTP packets 
For steganographic methods that utilize modification to 
the SCTP packets content possible detection techniques and 
proposed countermeasures are depicted in Table II. 
B. Methods that modify how SCTP packets are exchanged 
MULTI-HOMING 
It is worth noting that steganographic methods that utilize 
multi-homing are generally harder to detect than single-
homing ones, because to detect covert communication it 
requires observing traffic on few, different communication 
paths. 
Resistance to detection for method proposed in Section 3 
depends on how future typical SCTP implementations will 
behave. If alternative paths for retransmitted chunks will 
often change proposed steganographic method that utilizes 
multi-homing will be harder to detect. But if retransmitted 
chunks will be send through only one alternative path then 
other behavior will be treated as anomaly. Thus, requirement 
that states that retransmitted chunks should be sent through 
]/[)(log2 chunkbitssS MSB =−
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
only one alternative path should be enclosed in SCTP 
standard. 
TABLE II.   POSSIBLE STANDARD IMPROVEMENTS TO NEUTRALIZE 
STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS THAT MODUFY CONTENT OF SCTP PACKETS 
 
Whatever the implementation, statistical analysis of NIC 
addresses used for retransmitted chunks may help to detect 
hidden communication. 
Elimination of proposed steganographic method is 
possible by changing source and destination addresses of 
randomly chosen packet that contains retransmitted chunks. 
 
MULTI-STREAMING 
Similarly to the multi-homing based steganographic 
method detection of multi-streaming method may be hard to 
perform and depends on the concrete application were SCTP 
will be utilized. If the pattern of streams usage is established, 
then statistical SCTP traffic analysis may reveal hidden 
communication.  
Elimination of the proposed steganographic method may 
be achieved by changing TSNs by an intermediate node e.g. 
edge router with steganography detection functionality.   
Such operation may successfully interrupt proper exchange 
of hidden data.  
C. Hybrid method 
If the number of intentionally omitted chunks is kept to 
the reasonable level then detection of such method is hard – 
statistical analysis of the frequency of moving acknowledged 
TSNs may be helpful. 
Elimination of such method is possible by a specialized 
intermediate node which will be responsible for detection 
and dropping of chunks that have been already 
acknowledged by the receiver.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented sixteen different 
steganographic methods that can be used in SCTP protocol. 
All of these methods may lead to confidential information 
leakage and should be treated as a threat to network 
security. A lot of them may be evaded by changing SCTP 
standard – where it is possible certain improvements were 
proposed.  
This analysis emphasizes how important it is to further 
inspect other network protocols that are to be utilized in 
future networks to avoid hidden communication as early as 
possible, ideally, still at the standard development stage. 
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Steg. 
method Detection technique 
Countermeasure (proposed 
standard change) 
I1 Analysis of Verification Tags values. – 
I2 
Comparison between values of 
Maximum Inbound Streams sent by 
“normal” users (users who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
Limit possible values of Maximum 
Inbound Streams, i.e. only powers 
of 2 may be allowed. 
D1 
Comparison between values of Stream 
Sequence Number sent by “normal” 
users (users who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
For unordered transmission, Stream 
Sequence Number must be set to 0. 
D2 Checking value of Payload Stream Identifier. 
Only standardized values must be 
allowed. 
S1 Analysis of a_rwnd values and sizes of 
received chunks. – 
S2 Analysis of average number of duplicated chunks. – 
A1 Analysis of Shared Key Identifier 
values. 
Limit the number of shared keys for 
association to 1 or set one pair of 
shared keys for time slot, i.e. 10 
minutes. 
P1 Analysis of Padding Data. All bits of Padding Data must be set to 0. 
VP1 Checking the existence of IP addresses that are sent in these parameters. 
Remove these parameters. Replace 
them with new chunk type, which 
will be sent from each user’s 
address in order to add it to 
association. 
VP2 
Comparison between values of 
Heartbeat Info Parameter sent by 
normal user (user who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
Define value of Heartbeat Info 
Parameter. 
VP3 Analysis of Random Number. – 
VP4 
Comparison between values of 
ASCONF-Request Correlation ID sent 
by normal user (user who do not use 
steganography) and suspicious user. 
ASCONF-Request Correlation ID 
must be a sequence number. 
VP5 Analysis of Padding Data. All bits of Padding Data must be set to 0. 
